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Discussions of animal treatment within the global food in-
dustry often devolve into debates about animal rights. Such de-
tours needlessly distract from an ongoing social and environ-
mental catastrophe. This essay attempts to reframe the global 
food debate in a manner that more directly acknowledges our 
obligations to and the needs of the billions of animals enslaved 
within the industrial food apparatus.
Industrial agriculture has refashioned animal husbandry 
into a mechanized process that ignores historic methods of hu-
man/nonhuman animal interaction (methods that evolved over 
millennia) as well as ethical mores. These industrial methods 
– cloaked in the mantle of efficiency – have become deeply en-
trenched despite clear evidence of their unsustainability and 
unworkability. This intractability results from a systemic flaw 
inherent in the role of efficiency in society. Not only is efficiency 
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an amoral concept devoid of any normative component, but tho-
se who lionize it also routinely exclude externalities from their 
calculus. This makes any cost-based risk equation potentially 
unsound and misleading. 
Consequently, using efficiency as an ethical barometer is 
flawed both hermeneutically and practically. It should never 
have acquired a normative aspect and it should never have been 
defined to exclude externalities. The upshot of this double mis-
take is that the prevailing mode of human/animal interaction 
is unsustainable (inefficient) and ethically bankrupt. Reframing 
that interaction will require refashioning the legal system that 
enables it.
Part II of this essay examines the role of communication in 
the formation of law and social norms and the implications of 
that role for animal law and ethics. Part III contextualizes ani-
mal law within contemporary risk society. Part IV looks at how 
efficiency has transformed from an economic concept into a 
normative guideline and discusses how that transformation has 
affected animals and agriculture. It tracks the rise of industrial 
agriculture and ties it to this fundamental misunderstanding of 
the concept of efficiency. The essay concludes with some thou-
ghts on how to reformulate contemporary notions of efficiency 
and ethics to account for the idealism that should be a necessary 
component of communication and, consequently, of law.  
II. Communication and Law
Law governs interactions between and among members of 
society. It codifies shared goals that reflect an ideal vision of a 
just society.1 This aspirational vision of justice arises through 
communication. For communication to be coherent there must 
be a shared belief amongst the interlocutors in the possibility 
of consensus and mutual understanding. They must evince a 
willingness to come to an agreement about the truth/correct-
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ness of the matter under discussion.2 This shared commitment 
to agree forms the foundation of discourse, which in turn forms 
the foundation of norms that then become codified into law. 
Consensus-driven communication requires a common lan-
guage. Laws governing human interaction (property, contract, 
criminal, torts, etc.) all fit within the discursive framework of 
shared goals and commitment to the perpetuation of society. 
Animal law, however, does not. (Non-human) Animals do not 
share a language with humans. Consequently, they do not parti-
cipate in human discourse nor do they share the goals of human 
society. 
Without a common normative vision, there is no consensus 
from which to create laws. Animals are not merely an unwilling 
participant in the law-making process; they do not participate at 
all.  It therefore makes no sense to talk about animal law as such; 
it is more properly described as a set of laws governing how 
humans interact with the animals. 
This distinction is more than merely semantic. Human inte-
raction with animals lies within human control. However, the 
other side of that process – animal interaction with humans – 
resides entirely outside of human control. Given that the animal 
perspective is both varied and unknowable and that humans 
are social organisms who interact with other species, it is un-
derstandable and necessary that humans would create a set of 
rules to guide those interactions. But because those interactions 
lack any shared commitment to consensus, attempts to impart 
meaning to the process are necessarily counterfactual and ide-
ological. Herein lies what Aristotle might have described as the 
tragic nature of animal law. The impossibility of communication 
coupled with the immutable need for communication creates a 
crisis borne of conflicting truths that undermine meaningful 
interaction. 
Despite this seemingly unsolvable dilemma, there is some 
cause for hope. All communication is arguably counterfactual; 
that does not make it pointless. When humans communicate 
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they do not truly understand each other; they merely share the 
goal of achieving that understanding. As Habermas argues, it 
is not the existence of truth, but rather a shared commitment to 
its possibility that makes communication (and therefore society) 
possible.3 Similarly, with respect to animals, true, meaningful 
communication is impossible. However, if attempts at commu-
nication were made in good faith and predicated on a willing-
ness to exclude ideology and self-interest, then the human com-
ponent of the human/animal interaction would not differ funda-
mentally from other forms of discourse. 
The impossibility of an ideal state need not doom a socie-
ty founded on a commitment to its attainment. Consequently, 
the tragedy of animal law does not lie in its aspirational na-
ture. It lies rather in the way that human nature undermines 
those aspirations. This is clearly visible in the principles of risk 
management.
III. The Risks of the Risk Society
a. How Risk Society Came into Being
Ulrich Beck explains that: “Just as modernization dissolved 
the structure of feudal society in the nineteenth century and pro-
duced the industrial society, modernization today is dissolving 
industrial society and another modernity is coming into being.”4 
In industrial society, wealth production overshadowed risk pro-
duction because (among other reasons), the risks accompanying 
the ascendancy of industry were poorly understood and becau-
se the remnants of feudal society imputed a sense of preordai-
ned destiny both to social status and to the workings of environ-
ment.5 Furthermore, the omnipresent struggle against scarcity 
engendered a willingness to endure detrimental side effects. 
Beck notes, for example, that in the early 1800s, the Thames 
was so polluted that people who fell in d instead of drowning 
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– the result of inhaling the poisonous gases carpeting the river.6 
These and other risks arose as a consequence of moderniza-
tion and were easily apparent. Today (at least in the developed 
world), scarcity no longer drives production. Society now pro-
duces at such a rate that many of its hazards are associated with 
over-production. Furthermore, the accompanying risks of post-
industrial society are less visible (e.g., toxins in the food web, 
ozone depletion, climate change, etc.). These shifts have preci-
pitated a fundamental reordering of society. Managing risk has 
become at least as important as wealth amassment. 
Risk management in post-industrial society is reflexive; it is 
the “systematic way of dealing with hazards and insecurities in-
duced and introduced by modernization itself.”7 Because risks 
are often not readily perceptible, the task of identifying risk falls 
most often to science, propelling scientists into the role of neu-
tral and benevolent expert. Yet, identifying risk is not a neutral 
act. It has profound societal implications that transcend science. 
Risk identification determines what constitutes harm (an inhe-
rently subjective determination) and assesses whether that harm 
rises to a level requiring mitigation. In this manner, science, 
when wielded by the powerful, becomes the organizing princi-
ple around which society constructs its response to danger. 
Through its role as risk creator/assessor, science becomes the 
source of what Mary Douglas calls “taboo-thinking,” which uses 
the threat of danger to create and uphold community values.8 
Shared danger bonds society through the shared goal of mutual 
survival. Because modern threats are invisible, “experts” who 
inform the public of the existence of the threat and the proper 
response wield a powerful tool of mass coercion. This aggrega-
tion of power in the hands of a select few would be troubling 
enough by itself. The situation is exacerbated by the fact that the 
risks that science is tasked with identifying and mitigating are 
themselves the creations of science. 
Creation here refers not just to the social construction of risk 
(determining whether a given behavior constitutes a threat) but 
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also to the behavior itself. For example, once science identifies 
mass confinement of animals as a potential cause of pandemic 
influenza – it then must determine the proper reaction to that 
threat by determining whether the risks from continued con-
finement outweigh the benefits of (and to) industrial agricul-
ture. This is the process of defining risk and responding to it. 
Embedded within this identification/mitigation heuristic lies the 
fact that the confinement methodology is itself is a creation of 
science. 
The multi-tiered role of science in risk creation means that it 
is tasked with the impossible chore of neutral, critical self-eva-
luation. It engages in risk behavior, defines the risk created by 
that behavior, evaluates the level of threat produced, and then 
advises society on how to respond. 9 Allocating all these tasks to 
experts amounts to a wholesale abdication of responsibility by 
the lay public and by law-making bodies.  
While the public has become more aware of the existence of 
threats, it has also become increasingly unable to recognize them 
and complacent in its incompetence. It has effectively forfeited 
its “cognitive sovereignty.”10 That ignorance amounts to com-
plicity in a social structure constructed not around consensus 
and common belief but rather around the goals and conclusions 
of an elite sub-group.11 Horkheimer and Adorno’s warning of a 
post-enlightenment world wherein reason metamorphosed into 
technology seems profoundly and disturbingly apt.12
Nevertheless, the societal position of science remains unen-
viable. Risk management decisions that science must make re-
garding its own behavior and creations have potentially dra-
conian implications. As the number of risks increase and their 
consequences become more severe, the margin for error shrinks 
to the point where admitting mistake becomes a profoundly 
anti-social act.
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To admit today that one had been mistaken in setting the acceptable 
values for the safety of pesticides – which actually would be a normal 
case in science – amounts to the unleashing of a political (or economic) 
catastrophe, and must be prevented for that reason alone. The 
destructive forces scientists deal with in all fields today impose on 
them the inhuman law of infallibility. Not only is it one of the most 
human of all qualities to break this law, but the law itself stands in 
clear contradiction to science’s ideals of progress and critique…. 13
Science relies on experimentation and hypothesis. Uncertainty 
is inseparable from scientific method. Yet in a risk society, if sci-
ence admits error, the implications can be catastrophic both for 
society and for science’s privileged role within it. Consequently, 
science must act as the legitimating body for the regulatory ap-
paratus which straitjackets it. It is trapped in a self-perpetuating 
cycle of taboo-thinking.
This is the cycle of risk management. In order for modern 
society to function efficiently, risks must be assayed and behav-
ioral guidelines issued with the goal of attaining a smooth-func-
tioning, efficient society. In this manner, efficiency attains the 
status of norm, with science as its arbiter. Smooth functioning 
requires minimizing exposure to risk. And science determines 
risk and also the proper techniques for mitigation.
Were science not used to cause so many societal risks, thereby 
rendering it unable to objectively analyze potential threats, the 
process of identifying risk would be a quintessentially scientific 
task. Mitigation analysis contains a significant scientific com-
ponent. If the role of science involved simply theorizing about 
how to reduce threat levels, that would present little conflict 
with scientific method. However, when science is called upon 
to determine an acceptable level of risk, it takes on a normati-
ve function that becomes self-undermining. The unworkability 
of this arrangement becomes starkly apparent in the context of 
agriculture.
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b. Animals at Risk
In the early years of the last century and prior, farms were 
hotbeds of cultivated biodiversity. Farmers often raised a dozen 
or more species of fruits and vegetables, including corn, alfalfa 
and hay to support the pigs, cattle, chicken and horses that po-
pulated the farm. Less than a hundred years later, the animals 
are gone as is just about everything else save one or two crops 
– usually corn and/or soybeans.
The metamorphosis of small, diversified farms into large, 
mono-cultural, agribusinesses has many causes. However, as 
Michael Pollan explains, the biggest factor behind the transfor-
mation was cheap, abundant corn made possible both by the ad-
vent of nitrogen-based fertilizer and a generous (if misguided) 
program of agricultural subsidies.14 The availability of synthetic 
fertilizer meant that rotating crops became unnecessary and the 
nation’s growing demand for corn could be met with an even 
larger output by the nation’s farms.
Under normal economic conditions, corn’s superabundan-
ce would have glutted the market and caused prices to fall. 
However, New Deal farm programs set a target price for the 
corn and allowed farmers to take out loans, using their surplus 
corn as collateral. When prices recovered, farmers sold the corn 
and paid back the loans. If prices failed to recover, they kept the 
loan money in exchange for the government’s keeping the corn. 
The government could afford to wait until demand ticked up to 
put it on the market. In either case, surplus corn stayed off the 
market until demand revived.
Everything changed for agriculture in the United States 
during the 1970s. Earl Butz, President Nixon’s Secretary of 
Agriculture, introduced a new system of price supports that 
guaranteed farmers a set price for their corn no matter the ma-
rket price. Butz exhorted farmers to “get big or get out” and to 
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regard themselves as “agribusinessmen” rather than farmers.15 
A predetermined price per bushel of corn meant that growers 
had no incentive to decrease production when demand slacked. 
Instead, they were spurred to grow as much as possible and 
dump it into the market, which in turn caused prices to crater 
still more. 
As prices fell, successive farm bills lowered the guaranteed 
price paid to farmers, causing them to have to grow still more 
to eke out a profit. Consequently, the market became peren-
nially glutted with corn, small growers all but disappeared, and 
the need to utilize the ever-growing surplus became ever more 
urgent. Growers began feeding the corn to animals, including 
cattle, whose digestive systems cannot tolerate it without pro-
phylactic antibiotics and other medications. The feed itself was 
cheap but the consequences of the cattle ingesting that feed were 
not. From this tangled attempt to make efficient use of what 
should never have been grown, the factory farm emerged. 
 The story of other animals’ journeys from farm to 
Concentrated Animal Feedlot Operation (CAFO) is similar, al-
beit different in some key respects. For example, animal agri-
culture for pigs and chickens (not cattle) is highly vertically in-
tegrated. Growers do not own the animals and have no input 
into the manner in which the animals are fed or housed. They 
must simply obey the dictates of their corporate overlords. The 
growers also have little leverage with respect to the price they 
are paid for their labor. They cannot command prices sufficient 
to cover environmental degradation and waste disposal. As a 
result, these costs get externalized; they are passed along to the 
general public and not reflected either in the cost of production 
or in the retail price of the product.16 Instead, they become hid-
den costs, which, along with corn subsidies, become woven into 
the national tax burden. 
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IV. Efficiency
a. Efficiency as Norm
In order to turn agriculture into agribusiness, growers had to 
embrace large commercial enterprises as superior and prefera-
ble to small-scale farming. The alternative was replacement by 
others more sympathetic to the corporate goal. The goal: making 
agriculture more efficient. The missing option – one that to this 
day remains unentertained – involves interrogating the utility of 
efficiency as a bounding principle in agriculture. 
In economic terms, efficiency means getting the best possible 
return on an investment. Any resources spent should lead to a 
greater yield. In this sense, efficiency is a fundamental principle 
of a market economy. However, agriculture – and specifically 
animal agriculture – is not economics. While economics drives 
many facets of agriculture, that no more makes them equivalent 
than it makes gasoline the same as the car it powers. 
Agriculture is grounded in ecology. And, while ecology’s de-
finition has evolved over the years, it has always centered on the 
relationship between living things and their surroundings. It has 
been variously defined as: the study of the interaction between 
organisms and their environment, the study of the distribution 
and abundance of organisms, and the scientific study of the pro-
cesses influencing the distribution and abundance of organisms, 
the interactions among organisms, and the interactions between 
organisms and the transformation and flux of energy and mat-
ter. For none of these definitions, however, does efficiency serve 
as the organizing principle. 
When organisms interact with their environment, redistribu-
te themselves, or when the environment is in flux, one sees an 
almost wanton expenditure of energy. Whether it be the volume 
of water cascading into the ocean from a river after a rain or 
the playfulness of a polar bear cub frolicking on the ice, ener-
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gy and resources get expended in an almost orgiastic environ-
mental potlatch. The river’s swollen discharge will help keep 
the estuary’s salinity constant during a future dry time and the 
bear cub will use precious calories but that play will help it learn 
coordination and how to interact. Yet, at no time is there any 
regimented, perfect equilibrium sought, or any real method of 
calculating efficient behavior. 
Agriculture relies on human/animal interactions, which are 
subsumed within the ecological web even while forming part 
of the human economy. Ecology has no defined bounding prin-
ciples while the latter cleaves to efficiency. The relationship be-
tween ecological unpredictability and bottom line analytics has 
existed for centuries but the twentieth century witnessed a shift. 
Market dynamics became dominant; ecosystemic expenditures 
fell prey to accounting principles and animal behavior became 
almost irrelevant to animal “science.” As a result, the barnyard 
has become the stockyard, the farmyard a CAFO, and the manu-
re pile a sewage lagoon. 
When market efficiency displaced ecology as the founda-
tion of agriculture, another crucial component was lost as well. 
Ethics once provided the moral principles underlying human/
animal interactions. While one could argue (persuasively) that 
those principles were never sufficiently sensitive to the needs 
and welfare of the nonhuman animals, it lies beyond cavil that 
the treatment and care of animals in the days prior to indus-
trial agriculture differed markedly from their treatment now. 
Farmers used to house and feed animals in a manner that was 
designed to keep them comfortable, allowed them to be social, 
and to develop relationships with each other and with humans. 
These relationships did not necessarily maximize yield but were 
rather based on a set of normative guidelines even as the ultima-
te reality of the animals’ commodity status inevitably imbued 
that bond with a sense of unreality. 
One sees vestiges of this bifurcated relationship in agricultu-
ral education organizations like 4-H, where children are given 
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an animal to care, raise and nurture.  Often, the children grow 
to love these animals, even as they know they are raising them 
for slaughter. The culmination of their efforts usually happens 
at the county fair where the animals are auctioned for slaughter, 
leaving the children grief-stricken and heartsick even as parents 
and teachers congratulate them on a job well done. 
This complicated and problematic relationship between the 
children and their animals is emblematic of the tensions un-
derlying the traditional approach to animal husbandry. It was 
impossible to escape the animals’ commodity status even as 
ethics demanded their decent treatment and relationships ine-
vitably resulted. The advent of industrial agriculture simplified 
eliminated any tension within the human/animal relationship 
by completely commodifying the animals and removing ethics 
from the realm of the relevant with respect to their care and tre-
atment. Instead, the focus became exclusively on profit genera-
tion. Animals went from partially commodified beings whose 
value could be measured both in individual terms and as units 
of exchange value to simple merchandise whose value lies in 
decreased costs of care and increased value at alienation. 
An object’s market value increases with marketability lea-
ding to an increased desire to alienate it. The greater an object’s 
value, the greater the temptation to divest oneself of it. Thus, the 
realities of the marketplace make it both difficult and counter-
productive to form a relationship with a commodity, a fact that 
further facilitates objectification. In the case of animals, it also 
enables mistreatment.
Animals’ commodification confers an exchange value that, in 
the case of “meat” animals, is realized through death and dis-
memberment. For animal producers (milk cows, breeding sows, 
etc.), value emerges through maximizing productivity while 
minimizing costs. In neither instance does the animals’ quality 
of life enter the equation. Rather, in both cases, the economic 
incentive (which is, after all, what drives exchange value) lies 
with minimizing expenses associated with the thing while maxi-
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mizing its yield.17 It is easy to see how this logic leads to factory 
farms designed to maximize economic efficiency regardless of 
the impact on animals. It also catalyzed the industry’s vertical 
integration. As a result, a few large conglomerates now control 
the animal production process “from squeal to meal.”18 
Classification as a thing also exempts objects from any moral 
calculus. Exchange value is amoral; it is a function of demand. 
Owners maximize value through increasing marketability. 
Moral arguments as to the market value of things carry little 
practical weight because the two systems (moral and market) 
do not share a common mode of valuation.19
This basic incompatibility between relationships predicated 
on ethics and those predicated on commoditization means that 
the role of agriculture could never be other than problematic. 
However, the ascent of the factory farm was not inevitable. It 
could have been avoided and will eventually be undone prima-
rily for two reasons. 
First, the factory farm system is not efficient. It ignores exter-
nalities that render the cost/benefit calculus profoundly against 
its continuation and relies on a massive subsidies and a (gover-
nment abetted) propaganda campaign to sustain itself in the 
face of increasing public opprobrium. Second, circling back to 
Habermas’ thesis – communication (and society) does not requi-
re an ideal state in order to exist.20 They rather require a shared 
commitment to its attainment. Consequently, the incompatibi-
lity of agriculture, ethics and a market economy need not lead 
inevitably to catastrophe. The discord can rather serve as the 
basis for a discourse grounded in aspiration.
b. Agribusiness is Bad Business
As noted above and as has been well-covered elsewhere, indus-
trial agriculture’s dependence on cheap corn, which is a product 
of unsustainable government subsidies, means that the price of 
food does not reflect the actual cost to produce it. Nor does it re-
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flect the loss of biodiversity or the increase in the national carbon 
footprint that comes from increased reliance on petroleum-based 
fertilizers (crop rotation once served to replace depleted nitrogen in 
the soil but that practice has all but disappeared with the ascent of 
monoculture) and mass production of methane-emitting animals. 
Furthermore, industrial agriculture is the single largest producer 
of sewage waste in the United States. The waste collects in sewage 
lagoons, makes its way into the groundwater, surface water, and 
soil. This leads to massive and sometimes irremediable contamina-
tion problems, dead zones in the ocean, pernicious algae blooms, 
and other environmental problems. In addition, when the lagoons 
rupture or spill, it causes contamination and loss of life in rivers 
and surrounding ecosystems. 
When one further factors in the increase in antibiotic resis-
tant bacteria as well as the respiratory infections that result from 
inhaling the poisonous fumes from the facilities, the costs of 
maintaining large-scale animal confinement facilities becomes 
far from economical. Recent events have also shown the lurking 
dangers of deadly influenza, for which confinement agriculture 
provides an ideal incubator. The real and potential threat from 
an influenza pandemic is almost incalculable. 
Given all this, even if efficiency provided a normative basis 
for the treatment of nonhumans, industrial agriculture is wo-
efully inefficient on its own terms, and would be classified as 
unethical on that basis alone. But, as already noted, efficiency 
lacks a normative component. Norms derive from ethics, which 
do not cleave to any economic model. They are a set of princi-
ples designed to govern human interaction with each other and 
with their environment. In that sense, ethics represent a form of 
human ecology. 
Because ethics govern behavior and behavior implicates in-
teractions with the human and nonhuman environments, ethics 
have an ecological component. And, since ecology is the study of 
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flux (ecosystems constantly evolve; stasis – a lack of energy flow 
in or out of the system – means that the system is inert), ethics 
must constantly evolve to reflect that change. Ethics are fluid 
because both the environment and human relationships must 
always remain in flux. Aldo Leopold’s famous Land Ethic aptly 
captures the character of the human commitment to environ-
ment as well as the shifting parameters of that commitment.21 
Nonetheless ethics embody a dedication to the attainment of a 
just society and in that sense remain static.
While the tension between ethical behavior and an agricultu-
ral system based on commoditization of nonhumans was una-
voidable, it has also long been present. The shift from uneasy 
coexistence to monolithic dominance by the market-based ap-
proach to animal management was triggered by the emergence 
of the risk society. Both with respect to physical dangers – where 
threats became more dispersed and beyond the ken of the lay 
person – and in the realm of the economy, where the comple-
xity of commerce has increased exponentially in the past half-
century, the public has come to rely more and more on experts 
to interpret the incoming data and advise on the correct course 
of behavior.
With the state supporting large agribusiness, the views of the 
“experts” employed by those businesses increasingly came to 
dominate the discourse. Furthermore, the government experts 
worked within a regulatory regime that supported that market-
based approach. As industrial agriculture become integrally 
woven into the fabric of the economy, the risks inherent in that 
approach (pollution, economic collapse, systemic animal abuse, 
etc.) became hidden costs and embedded in a downward spira-
ling feedback loop. The risks themselves grew worse as the risk 
behavior became more prevalent (industrial agriculture has be-
come a worldwide phenomenon) and the increased risks meant 
that the risks associated with their exposure also increased. 
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c. Science as Gatekeeper
Were science not the cause of so many societal risks and thus 
unable to objectively analyze the existence of dimensions of po-
tential threats, the process of identifying risk would be a quin-
tessentially scientific task. If the role of science (both hard and 
social) involved simply theorizing about how to reduce thre-
at levels, there would be little conflict with scientific method. 
However, when science is called upon to determine an accepta-
ble level of risk, its actions take on a normative component that 
undermines the entire process.
The same “experts” who invented and propagated the me-
thods that generated the risks must also assess the danger from 
those methods and, if necessary, expose it and suggest mitiga-
ting measures. Those obligations put scientists and economists 
in the unenviable position of assessing whether the risks created 
by their behavior were worthwhile – that is to say how much 
danger and damage from the sanctioned behavior is acceptable. 
And it is precisely here when the risk assessment leaves the real 
of science and enters the realm of ethics. It is also an unsustai-
nable conflict of interest and precisely the situation in which we 
find ourselves today with respect to industrial agriculture.
The inhumane treatment of animals has been rationalized 
as the inevitable byproduct of efficient agriculture. As a result, 
industrial agriculture flourished and became interwoven with 
the global economy. Now, as the flaws in the industrial model 
become increasingly clear, so too do the risks inherent in mo-
ving away from that model. Society has grown to depend on 
and expect cheap, mass produced meat, which in turn requires 
enormous amounts of corn, which in turn requires government 
subsidies, inhumane, confinement agriculture and antibiotics. 
Yet, abandoning that model will cause significant economic 
upheaval, social unrest, and undermine faith in those who have 
been entrusted with safeguarding society.  In sum, protecting 
society from the danger will involve endangering that same so-
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ciety. This situation involves a risk analysis that those who crea-
ted the situation are ill-equipped to make.
V. Conclusion 
Untangling this Gordian knot of dependence involves ack-
nowledging the essential incompatibility of certain foundational 
ethical precepts (i.e. humane interaction with nonhumans) with 
a market-based approach to agriculture. This intractable conflict 
could lead to systemic paralysis or collapse. However, it need 
not so long as the aspirational nature of society is recognized and 
embraced. As Habermas observes, communication (and society) 
is built on the counter-factual premise that the conditions for 
ideal discourse (a just society) exist and that true consensus (free 
of any externally imposed constraints) is possible. Similarly, so-
cial ideals and the laws that codify them are counter-factual as 
well. They are aspirational – representing a shared vision of a 
society where externally imposed behavioral standards would 
not be necessary. Norms (and laws) presuppose a shared com-
mitment to consensus and ethical behavior even as their very 
existence testifies to the absence of that consensus.  
In this sense, human society is predicated on a set of contra-
dictions. On the one hand this might be fodder for a legitimation 
crisis. On the other hand, it is profoundly reassuring in that this 
foundational contradiction within society does not mean its ine-
vitable demise or that nihilism will envelop us all. On a practical 
level, however, the problem of industrial agriculture remains.
Recalibrating our relationship to animals within the ecolo-
gy of the market will involve several steps. The first step invol-
ves recognizing the dichotomy between efficiency and ethics. 
Efficiency has no normative component and ethics have no ne-
cessary relationship with efficiency. In the context of agricultu-
re, acknowledging this schism will require a through reexami-
nation of the role the notion of efficiency plays in determining 
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acceptable treatment of nonhumans and a recognition that a de-
liberate indifference to life does not align with any extant ethical 
vision.
The second step requires acknowledging that the current vi-
sion of agricultural efficiency is based on flawed assumptions 
and bad science. It has wrought ecological havoc and undermi-
ned the global economy. In addition, as factory farming spreads, 
so too do worldwide health problems, including obesity, diabe-
tes, and heart disease. 
Industrial agriculture has grown ascendant because of its dra-
wbacks have been deliberately obscured. It has used subsidies to 
obscure a lack of profitability, sited its facilities far from population 
centers to keep the animals from prying eyes, and successfully lo-
bbied for the exemption of its methods from animal cruelty laws, 
All of these strategies allowed the public to embrace ignorance and 
to assume that their safety was entrusted to a sagacious and risk 
averse set of experts. But as Aldo Leopold observed, “too much 
safety seems to yield only danger in the long run.”22 Ignorance has 
led to a dangerous loss of agency. People are no longer in touch 
with their food. Even as the animals they consume have devolved 
almost entirely into commodities, those who consume them have 
divorced themselves from the process that turned the animals into 
food. Ignorance has obscured responsibility. Therein lies the first 
and most important step in the unmaking of the factory farm. We 
must learn to own what we eat. 
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